New testimony reveals major IAF failures during the October 7 massacre, including delays in response, missed warnings, and pilot frustration over centralized control.

The Israel Air Force saw "severe failures" during the October 7, 2023, massacre, including a "chain of incorrect decisions, overly rigid control structures, and an inability to understand real-time situations," Brig.-Gen. (res.) Oren Solomon told N12 News on Saturday.

Solomon is one of the leading investigators into the IDF's failures in preventing the massacre.

"IAF receives intelligence reports at night, with no situation assessment process taking place," Solomon told N12.

"Everyone got a call on the red phone line [used for operational, interdepartmental communications] and said 'yes, we understood,' before hanging up, and carrying out no operational processes connected to intelligence received."

On that night, the Intelligence Directorate received indications of Hamas preparations, but the IAF did not receive the signals.

Former IDF leadership dismissed possibility of Hamas attack on 10/7

"At 2:30 a.m., a young female officer was sitting in the office when intelligence indications arrived that Hamas was planning something," Solomon commented.

She asked to receive intelligence materials to better understand the information from the intelligence directorate and Unit 8200, but was told that she was not authorized, he stated. The officer called military intelligence approximately 50 times to get approval, but still did not receive any documents or materials.

Then-chief of staff Herzi Halevi conducted a situation assessment at approximately 4 a.m., and "almost completely dismissed the possibility that Hamas would attack from the air," Solomon said. This assessment was made without consulting IAF chief Maj.-Gen. Tomer Bar.

"Israel was hit by dozens of drones that exploded on IDF outposts, vehicles, and observation towers. Six terrorists on gliders also began a killing spree," Solomon recounted.

The IAF did not have a situational picture when the terrorists infiltrated at 6:29 a.m. onwards. However, after only 24 minutes, it had received concrete information on two mass-scale infiltrations, he said.

At 6:53 a.m., the Gaza Division's duty operations officer told IAF's central command about "several simultaneous raids." Despite being told of an expanded fire policy, the IAF did not attack the area of the barrier, and the IDF's Southern Command did not request them to do so, Solomon recounted.

"What did the planes do instead of taking off immediately and striking terrorists at the barrier between Gaza and Israel? They planned, sat on the ground for almost three hours, and did not attack," Solomon commented.

"At 7:10 a.m., the order was given to conduct airstrikes, but planes did not attack until 10:30."

Then-Gaza Division chief Avi Rosenfeld pleaded with the IAF to strike, but the air force did not exercise "independent thinking," and the barrier fence was not struck, Solomon added.

In addition, the air force did not attack infiltration routes, which thousands of terrorists used to enter Israel. This allowed some terrorists to return to the Gaza Strip following their infiltration, including a selection who managed to infiltrate on three separate occasions during the massacre, Solomon said.

Shortly before 10 a.m., Bar issued an order to strike the barrier, but this was only carried out at noon.

IAF Commander: 'We failed, but we were not negligent'

At a conference at Palmachim Air Base, approximately one year after the massacre, Bar commented that the IAF "failed but was not neglectful."

"We were not effective enough because we were not prepared for this scenario. We did not challenge the conception that Hamas had been deterred. This was a mistake," Bar said at the time.

"We must admit that we failed to defend Israel's skies. We did not know that the gliders were associated with a concrete Hamas plan, and our preparedness for a drone threat was too delayed," Bar added.

Pilots, navigators express frustration at Air Force command faults

At the same conference, air force pilots and navigators who were conducting operations during the massacre expressed their frustration at the force's central operations command.

"I think we missed hundreds of targets because control is too centralized," a pilot said, according to N12.

"The central control is killing us. The orders are killing us," a senior officer added.

"There was no firing without approval, no initiative, and no striving for contact with the enemy. Whoever took the initiative was reprimanded. We developed fears of making small mistakes, which led to us making big mistakes," the commander of Air Force Commando unit, Shaldag, commented.

One pilot also described the impossible decision-making, including how to act on reports of kidnapping attempts.

"There were reports of kidnapping attempts, but you had no way to separate who is who, what is what. I saw a vehicle and would say 'there is a good chance it is carrying hostages,'" the pilot, who operated near Kibbutz Nahal Oz, said.

Another pilot could have destroyed a convoy of pickup trucks, but could not determine whether they belonged to terrorists from the height of his cockpit, N12 added.

This pilot sent coordinates to receive an indication that his suspicion that they belonged to terrorists was correct, but nobody confirmed it. The convoy ended up travelling to Kibbutz Be'eri, where it reinforced infiltrating terrorists in their massacre.

IAF failed to learn from precedent

Four months before the massacre, an incident near Jenin in the northern West Bank occurred, which should have taught the IAF lessons on the importance of independent thinking, N12's report noted.

During the incident, an IAF pilot was dealing with an arrest operation which became complicated when a vehicle drove over an explosive device, disabling the vehicle, and wounding the IDF soldiers inside. Armed terrorists then approached the vehicle.

The pilot was asked to carry out a warning fire, which was unusual in the West Bank before October 7. Then-IDF Central Command chief, Maj.-Gen. (ret.) Yehuda Fox did not approve the opening of fire. The pilot then violated an order and fired under their own initiative. The incident was then investigated, and the pilot's decision was approved.

The IDF found that the air force met all readiness requirements, carrying out all orders given to it, the Turgeman Commission found, the military confirmed.